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Credit Cards: Weapons for Domestic Violence
CHRISTINE KIM*
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, Nicole Brown Simpson was brutally murdered.1 Images
of O.J. Simpson’s criminal trial became ingrained in popular culture,2 but the
long history of domestic abuse that O.J. Simpson inflicted upon Nicole has
largely been forgotten by today’s collective consciousness.3 Police were called to
intervene during domestic disputes on nine occasions during the years prior to
her killing.4 Even the prosecution minimized the abuse as the trial progressed.5
As the prosecution predicted, jurors could not grasp why domestic abuse was
relevant to her death.6 One juror asked, “What did all the talk about domestic
abuse have to do with homicide?”7
The trial helped educate the public about the link between domestic
violence and homicide.8 But even with this national awakening and Congress’
immediate passage of federal legislation and funding for domestic violence
Copyright © 2015 by Christine Kim
*
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1. Nancy Dillon, Revisiting the O.J. Simpson Trial, 20 years After the Infamous Bronco Chase, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Jun. 8, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ revisiting-osimpson-trial-20 -years-article-1.1821355.
2. See id. (citing the imagery of the ill-fitting leather gloves to the white Bronco).
3. See e.g., O.J. Simpson Murder Case, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People_of_the_
State_of_California_vs._Orenthal_James_Simpson (mentioning domestic abuse in 1989 but not prior
incidents) (last updated Jan 22, 2014).
4. Josh Meyer, Police Records Detail 1989 Beating That Led to Charge: Violence: A Bloodied Nicole
Simpson, Hiding in Bushes After 911 Call, Told Officers: 'He's going to kill me.' Judge Overruled Prosecutors'
Request that Simpson Serve Jail Time, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-0617/news/mn-5290_1_jail-time. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1909-10 (1996) (noting the critical response to
Nicole Brown Simpson’s murder).
5. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 3 (2007).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. See ETHEL KLEIN ET AL., ENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CHANGING PUBLIC
PERCEPTIONS/HALTING THE EPIDEMIC 8–9, 95–96 (1997) (explaining that trial was “a national ‘teach-in’
on the issue of domestic violence,” and one year later, poll participants said domestic violence was an
extremely important problem). Some argue that, while the trial showed the connection between
murder and domestic violence, the O.J. Simpson trial obscured the underlying issues of domestic
violence. See e.g., Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in
Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5 (1998) (arguing politicization of O.J. trials around race
caused public to see domestic violence as a white woman’s problem); Aya Gruber, A "Neo-Feminist"
Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583, 603–04 (2012)
(stating domestic violence movement took “oversimplified” view of issue as “innocent, non-poor,
white women”).

281

Kim_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

282 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

6/3/2015 7:50 PM

Volume 22:281 2015

prevention,9 the prevalence of domestic violence remains staggeringly high.10
Just as the nation was asked to redefine domestic violence as a criminal act with
deadly consequences, our conception of domestic violence must continue to
evolve as research uncovers the factors intrinsic to violent relationships and the
new weapons abusers yield to harm their victims.11
One new weapon abusers are increasingly exploiting is debt.12 Angela
Littwin’s groundbreaking research into domestic violence and credit lead to the
identification of a more specific form of domestic violence abuse: coerced debt.13
Coerced debt is defined as “all nonconsensual, credit-related transactions that
occur in a violent relationship, not just matters that depend on the express
application of force.”14 Examples of coerced debt include “abusers taking out
credit cards in their partners’ names without their knowledge, forcing victims to
obtain loans for the abuser, [and] tricking victims into signing quitclaim deeds
for the family home.”15 Although debt is not a recent invention,16 over the past
twenty years, credit cards and other consumer products have become easier to
obtain, making coerced debt a more viable instrument for abusers.17
Today, credit cards are ubiquitous.18 Credit card issuers have found it
9. Within months of Nicole’s murder, the Violence Against Women Act was passed as part of
an omnibus bill. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat.1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 15, 16, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
10. The national lifetime prevalence of intimate partner physical violence is 31.5% among
women. Matthew J. Breiding et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and
Intimate Partner Violence Victimization — National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United
States, 2011, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 9 (2014) [hereinafter Breiding, NIPSVS 2011],
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6308a1.htm. From 2003 to 2012,
domestic violence comprised 21% of all nonfatal violent crime. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E.
MORGAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: NONFATAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2003-2012 1
(2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf. In 2010, approximately 39%
of female homicides were committed by an intimate partner. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF VICTIMIZATION, 1993-2011 3
(2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvav9311.pdf.
11. An example of new technologies used by abusers to stalk and manipulate victims include
spyware and GPS tracking. Justine A. Dunlap, Intimate Terrorism and Technology: There's an App for
That, 7 U. MASS. L. REV. 10, 21–23 (2012).
12. Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 951, 953 (2012) [hereinafter Littwin, Coerced Debt] (“As consumer lending has permeated
American life, violent partners have begun using debt as a means of exercising abusive control,
making the consumer credit system an unknowing party to domestic violence.”).
13. Id. at 954.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Brian M. McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory of
Usury, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549, 555 (2008) (“The Athenians allowed transactions in credit to proceed
unregulated. Although Athens became known for its sophisticated commercial credit market, it was
infamous for the highest consumer interest rates in the ancient world at 9,000 percent.”).
17. See Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit Cards, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 339, 353-54 (2011) (highlighting the “democratization of credit”); Angela Littwin, Beyond
Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 453
(2008) [hereinafter Littwin, Beyond Usury] (noting the adverse effects of available credit for lowincome families).
18. Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 557, 583 (2009).

Kim_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

6/3/2015 7:50 PM

CREDIT CARDS: WEAPONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

283

profitable to offer credit to higher-risk individuals.19 Applications submitted
through websites or from mail solicitations have exponentially grown and have
largely replaced in-person meetings to apply for credit at a local bank.20 Such
innovations necessarily introduce new risks, including identity theft and fraud.21
Congress has enacted multiple statutes in response to such threats, including a
statute that compels financial institutions to safeguard personal information or
implement identity theft warning systems.22 In comparison, there has been little
research on coerced debt, and even less on the potential regulatory framework,
as well as credit card company policies relating to coerced debt.23
Research has only recently begun to fully comprehend the consumer and
credit dimensions of domestic violence.24 This article will argue that consumer
protection statutes and financial institutions do not adequately protect domestic
violence victims from coerced debt. Based on data that I collected after contacting
twenty credit card companies to inquire into their domestic violence policies, I
argue that domestic violence victims have been left behind in credit card
regulation, consumer protection policy, and private enforcement. Part I of this
article provides background on definitions of domestic violence and reviews
recent empirical research into the prevalence of economic abuse and coerced
debt. Part II of the article discusses changes in credit card issuing, and how those
changes impact domestic violence victims. Part III describes the methodology
and results of a qualitative study into the top twenty issuers of credit cards in the
United States. Part IV compares the growth of the domestic violence movements
with elder abuse movements to show that credit card issuers have responded to
the needs of the elderly, but not domestic violence victims. This comparison will
show that domestic violence survivors have been left behind in financial services
regulation. Part V discusses potential options for future regulatory or private
19. David A. Lander, “It ‘is’ the Best of Times, It ‘is’ the Worst of Times": A Short Essay on Consumer
Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 204–05 (2004).
20. See Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63,
73 (2006) (“People who thirty years ago would not have been able to get an appointment to see a loan
officer at a local bank can now get multiple offers for a home mortgage, an auto loan, or a credit card
after filling out an application on the Internet.”); Kelly M. Miley, Electronic Banking, 15 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 2, 6–7, 9 (1996) (discussing how banking institutions, like Wells Fargo, rolled out online
portals for products in 1995 and 1996, including “accepting credit card applications over the
Internet”); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1420 (2004) (noting that over five
billion solicitations were sent in one year in America).
21. See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Reinventing Consumer Protection, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 45, 45
(2007) (“In 2006, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) measured reported consumer fraud losses in
the United States at $1.1 billion, but this figure failed to account for undetected or unreported
transactions.”).
22. See Christine Daleiden, Identity Theft and Consumer Protection Under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 16 HAW. B.J. 4, 7–8 (2012) (“The Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act . . . established
numerous protections for consumers from identity theft. . . . FACTA also imposes numerous
regulatory requirements on parties who maintain personal information about individuals: financial
institutions, credit reporting agencies . . . .”); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known
Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97, 100 (2007) (noting that Congress defined identity theft in
2007 by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1028).
23. Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit Reports Damaged by
Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 363, 429 n.3 (2013) [hereinafter Littwin, Battered Credit] (“There
are no other academic articles on coerced debt.”).
24. See discussion infra Part I.B.

Kim_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

284 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

6/3/2015 7:50 PM

Volume 22:281 2015

programs for responding to coerced debt.
I. EMPIRICAL DATA ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & COERCED DEBT:
A. Defining Domestic Violence and Coerced Debt
Domestic violence is generally seen as involving “physical violence, sexual
violence, stalking, and psychological aggression (including coercive tactics) by a
current or former intimate partner.”25 That violence can take place “among
cohabitating or noncohabitating . . . opposite or same-sex couples”26 and “does
not require sexual intimacy.”27 In 2007, Evan Stark argued for a reframing of
domestic violence in his seminal work, Coercive Control.28 Domestic abuse has
commonly been associated with physical assault,29 and most media coverage of
domestic violence focuses on this physical aspect.30 In contrast, Stark defines
domestic abuse as “a course of calculated, malevolent conduct . . . interweaving
repeated physical abuse with three equally important tactics: intimidation,
isolation, and control.”31 Stark argues that the “primary harm abusive men inflict
is political, not physical, and reflects the deprivation of rights and resources that
are critical to personhood and citizenship.”32 He considers each specific act of
violence within “an ongoing and gender-specific pattern of coercive and
controlling behaviors that causes a range of harm in addition to injury.”33 Stark’s
theory offers a more holistic and sophisticated portrayal of domestic violence
than one focusing primarily on physical abuse or even isolated incidents of
physical abuse.34
Researchers have continued to hone this coercive control theory by
measuring specific behaviors that frequently accompany or are central to an
abuser’s pattern of violence.35 The CDC defines coercive control as a form of
25. MATTHEW J. BREIDING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES — 2010 7
(2014), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cdc_nisvs_ipv_report_2013_v17_
single_a.pdf. I use the term domestic violence synonymously with the term intimate partner violence.
26. Id.
27. Intimate Partner Violence: Definitions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/intimatepartnerviolence/definitions.html (last updated Nov. 25,
2014).
28. STARK, supra note 5, at 3–6.
29. In the 1990s, Lenore Walker also developed the cycle theory of violence, which identified
three phases: “(1) tension building, (2) the acute battering incident, and (3) loving contrition.” Mia M.
McFarlane, Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence: An Inappropriate Response for New York Health
Care Professionals, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1999). In this theory, the cycle revolves around
moments of violence. Id. Ellen Pence developed the Power and Control Wheel, which theorized
domestic violence as a pattern of behavior where other forms of abuse, like emotional and economic
abuse, filled the periods between physical violence. Id.
30. STARK, supra note 5, at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 99–100.
34. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Progress: Translating Evan Stark’s Coercive Control Into Legal
Doctrine for Abused Women, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1458, 1459 (2009) [hereinafter Hanna,
Paradox] (critiquing Evan Stark’s portrayal of domestic violence).
35. See e.g., Adrienne E. Adams et al., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE
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psychological aggression that includes “behaviors that are intended to monitor,
control, or threaten an intimate partner.”36 According to the CDC, one type of
coercive control behavior includes economic abuse, defined as “behaviors that
control a woman’s ability to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources.” 37
Although the CDC considers economic abuse as a subset of psychological abuse,
researchers now argue that economic abuse should be considered distinct from
psychological abuse.38 They suggest economic abuse takes three unique forms:
economic control, economic exploitation, and employment sabotage.39 Coerced
debt is a specific form of economic abuse that involves “all nonconsensual,
credit-related transactions that occur in a violent relationship, not just matters
that depend on the express application of force.”40 Coerced debt spans both the
economic control and economic exploitation categories of financial abuse.41
Physical, sexual, and psychological abusive behaviors have all been widely
researched, but financial abuse and economic control have only become a topic
of study recently.42
B. Measuring Coerced Debt
According to the CDC, the lifetime prevalence of all forms of coercive
control for women is 39.9%, and 40.4% for men.43 There has been little research
on the prevalence of coerced debt and economic abuse,44 and such research has
AGAINST WOMEN 563 (2008) (noting the difficulty of measuring economic abuse); Terri L. Weaver et
al., Development and Preliminary Psychometric Evaluation of the Domestic Violence–Related Financial Issues
Scale (DV-FI), 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 569 (2009) (utilizing an explanatory factor analysis to
study domestic violence and related financial issues).
36. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL OF THE CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY:
2010 SUMMARY REPORT 10 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs
_report2010-a.pdf. It is important to note that 48.4% of lesbian women, 68.8% of bisexual women, and
48.2% of bisexual men reported experiencing coercive control in their lifetime. MIKEL L. WALTERS ET
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL OF THE CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 FINDINGS ON
VICTIMIZATION
BY
SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
23–24
(2013),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_SOfindings.pdf.
37. Adams et al., supra note 35, at 563–66.
38. Amanda Mathisen Stylianou et al., Measuring Abusive Behaviors: Is Economic Abuse a Unique
Form of Abuse?, 28 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3186, 3199–201 (2013).
39. Id. at 3189.
40. Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 954.
41. Angela Littwin notes that research in economic coercive control behaviors identifies two
categories, “preventing victims from earning money and controlling their access to money the family
has earned,” and that coerced debt falls within the latter category. Littwin, Battered Credit, supra note
23, at 374. However that conceptualization is a different theory than the three-pronged one used here.
42. Stylianou et al., supra note 38, at 3197.
43. Breiding, NIPSVS 2011, supra note 10, at 10.
44. Stylianou et al., supra note 38, at 3187. The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, the leading
study into consumer bankruptcy, asked consumer bankruptcy filers questions regarding domestic
violence and demonstrated that domestic violence survivors are disproportionately represented in
comparison to the general population. See Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 962–69.
However, this study focused on physical and sexual violence experienced by bankruptcy filers and
not coerced debt. See id. at 968–69 tbl.2 (listing questions asked to participants showing that these
questions do not include issues of coerced debt).
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only been preliminary.45 In a study by Michigan State University psychologists,
researchers interviewed 103 women who received assistance from domestic
abuse victim agencies in a Midwestern state46 and found that 99% of these
women had experienced some type of economic abuse from their partners.47 The
study developed the Scale of Economic Abuse (SEA), which asks domestic
violence victims twenty-eight questions about specific actions taken by their
abusive partners. For example, the SEA asked the victim how frequently their
abuser would “[s]teal the car keys or take the car so you couldn’t go look for a
job or go to a job interview” and “[t]hreaten you or beat you up for paying the
bills or buying things that were needed.”48 The researcher grouped each question
into two subscales: Economic Control and Economic Exploitation.49 Angela
Littwin analyzed this study in her article, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer
Credit in Domestic Violence, and identified eleven questions from the survey that
affect whether a victim is able to pay off debt, have access to a credit card, or
prevent the abuser’s use of the victim’s credit card.50 The questions involving
credit- and non-credit-related behaviors were almost all grouped together into a
single question, complicating the results for coerced debt.51
In a second study of domestic abuse victims by Rutgers University
researchers, 94.2% of the participants experienced some form of economic
abuse.52 This study interviewed 120 women recruited from domestic violence
programs across 10 states.53 This study used a Modified Scale of Economic
Abuse, which reduced the SEA to twelve questions grouped into three
categories: economic control, economic exploitative behaviors, and employment
sabotage.54 Of the participants, 79% experienced economic exploitative
behaviors, which included “[b]uild up debt under [their] name by doing things
like us[ing] [their] credit card or run[ing] up the phone bill.” 55 Similarly, 79%
experienced economic control, which included behaviors like “[k]eep[ing]
financial information from [them].”56 Since this modified scale was based on the
45. See Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 960 (“Like the original research presented in this
Essay, the one previous study of coerced debt was preliminary.”).
46. Adams et al., supra note 35 at 570–71.The women’s ages ranged from 18 to 85, and 48% of the
women were African American, 45% white, 1% Asian, and 5% Hispanic/Latina. Id. at 571.
47. Id. at 580.
48. Id. at 58.
49. Id. at 574.
50. Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 960–61.
51. See Adams et al., supra note 35, at 583 app. (including “[b]uild up debt under your name by
doing things like use your credit card or run up the phone bill”); Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12,
at 960–61 (“The extent to which some of these items are measuring credit-related behavior is
currently unclear.”).
52. Judy L. Postmus, et al., Understanding Economic Abuse in the Lives of Survivors, 27 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 411, 419 (2012).
53. Id. at 416. Specifically, the researchers only invited adults from these domestic violence
programs who “had attended at least one individual or group session during which the economic
empowerment curriculum information had been shared.” Id. The participants ranged from age 18 to
73, and approximately 55% were white, 20% African American, 18% Latina/Hispanic, and 8%
biracial, Native American or other racial identity. Id.
54. Id. at 411.
55. Id. at 411, 420.
56. Id.

Kim_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

6/3/2015 7:50 PM

CREDIT CARDS: WEAPONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

287

same scale in the Michigan State University study, the results pertaining to
credit-related behaviors are similarly unclear.57
The scholars on the forefront of this research admit that their collective
knowledge of economic abuse “is still in its infancy”58 and that more studies are
necessary to understand how the economic dimensions of abusive relationships
prevent women from escaping.59 Nonetheless, the researchers conclude that such
high percentages of women experiencing economic abuse indicates a “pressing
need” for changes to state and federal policies to prohibit economic abuse and
fund financial literacy programs.60 Considering the rise of credit card use, as
discussed in the following Parts, more research is needed specifically on coerced
debt, so that credit-related policies and interventions can better respond to the
needs of domestic violence victims.
II. WHY CREDIT CARDS MATTER FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
There are numerous barriers preventing domestic violence victims from
breaking themselves out of the abusive cycle and remaining free. Factors include
safety, inefficient law enforcement response, biases against domestic violence
victims, economic dependence, and homelessness.61 Domestic violence survivors
will often leave their relationships with damaged credit,62 loss of property, legal
fees, medical bills, cost of new housing, and marred employment histories.63
A primary reason that many women do not try to leave their abusers is that
they lack the adequate material resources to do so.64 Inadequate material
resources lead to a victim’s economic dependency on the abuser.65 Studies have
57. See id. at 420 tbl.I (including as an item “[b]uild up debt under your name by doing things
like use your credit card or run up phone bills”). For a 2013 study using the same scale, see Stylianou
et al., supra note 38.
58. Stylianou et al., supra note 38, at 3188.
59. Id. at 3201.
60. Id. at 3200.
61. Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339, 356 (2014); see also Sarah M. Buel, A Lawyer's Understanding of Domestic
Violence, 62 TEX. B.J. 936, 939 (1999) (citing as other factors “the batterer's stalking and sabotage of any
steps toward independence” and “physical or mental disability, advanced age, homelessness, medical
problems, no available shelter space, religious beliefs, extreme youth, or immigration status,” as well
as “lack of money, job skills, affordable child care and housing”).
62. Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 1001.
63. See Michael A. Anderson et al., “Why Doesn’t She Just Leave?”: A Descriptive Study of Victim
Reported Impediments to Her Safety, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 153 tbl.I. (2003) (listing the types of abuses
leading to these types of outcomes, including physical abuse leading to hospital stays, and thus,
medical bills); Sara J. Shoener & Erika A. Sussman, Economic Ripple Effect of IPV: Building Partnerships
for Systemic Change, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 83, 84 fig.1 (Aug./Sept. 2013) (noting both the long- and
short-term effects of leaving the relationship), available at http://www.csaj.org/documentlibrary/Shoener_and_Sussman_2013_-_Economic_Ripple_Effect_of_IPV.pdf ;
Jamie Haar, Women's Work: Economic Security in the Domestic Violence Context, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 471, 481, 491 (2014) (citing lack of employment protections as a factor and “tax liability, consumer
credit debt, loss of unemployment insurance, and lack of property rights” as consequences of
domestic violence).
64. See Adams et al., supra note 35, at 568 (“Studies have consistently identified economic
dependence as a critical obstacle for many women who are attempting to leave abusive partners.”).
65. Weaver et al., supra note 35, at 570.
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shown that the level of economic dependency negatively correlates with the
likelihood that the victim will leave the abuser.66 If the victim is financially
dependent on an abuser, she may feel obliged to stay with her abuser and find it
more difficult to press criminal charges or seek restraining orders.67 The
relationship of domestic violence and financial insecurity is circular.68 Abusers
control their victims’ access to material resources and cause financial instability,
which increases the victims’ further susceptibility to violence and erects obstacles
for them to escape to safety.69
Coerced debt may lead to destroyed credit ratings, which in turn, makes
creating a life liberated from the abuser even more difficult.70 Damaged credit
obstructs the victim’s ability to secure the basic necessities for leaving the
relationship, including housing, employment, and utilities, since landlords,
employers, and utilities companies regularly consult credit scores to screen
applicants.71 Consequently, damaged credit has led to “longer shelter stays,
victims returning to their abusers, or victims making financial calculations that
resulted in them not leaving their abusers in the first place.”72 Since coerced debt
results in such daunting costs for its victims, researchers must better understand
the mechanisms for how and why coerced debt can be so easily utilized as a form
of abuse.
A. How Has Credit Become a Weapon?
Today, approximately 75% of American households own at least one credit
card, which household maintaining an average of $7,400 in credit card debt.73
Cardholders have roughly eight credit cards each.74 This was not always the case.
Consumer lending did not constitute part of the portfolio of banks in America for
most of the nation’s history.75 Diners Club created the first charge card in 1949,76
66. Id.
67. Id.; Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is Political and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence,
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 401 (2007); Angela M. Moore Parmley, Violence Against Women Post VAWA:
Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1417, 1422 (2004).
68. Shoener & Sussman, supra note 63 at 83.Although the lifetime prevalence of physical
violence by an intimate partner is less than a third among women, approximately half of all women
participating in Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) had experienced domestic violence.
NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, SHORTCHANGING SURVIVORS: THE FAMILY VIOLENCE
OPTION FOR TANF BENEFITS 5 (2009), available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/NLCHP_
ShortchangingSurvivorsTheFVOptionForTANFbeneftis_12-2009.pdf.
69. Id.
70. See Angela Littwin, Battered Credit, supra note 23, at 366 (“Coerced debt wreaks havoc on
credit scores. Victims of coerced debt often do not discover the debt until they attempt to leave an
abusive relationship, when much of the debt is delinquent or in danger of becoming so.”).
71. Id. at 366–67.
72. Id. at 367.
73. Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M. L. REV. 327, 333–34
(2014).
74. Id.
75. Michael L. Starzec, The Legal History of Credit in Four Thousand Years (or Less), 26 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 107, 114 (2013).
76. Andrea Freeman, Payback: A Structural Analysis of the Credit Card Problem, 55 ARIZ. L. REV.
151, 159 (2013). Although charge cards were invented at this time, credit for consumption of goods
has existed since antiquity. LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CULTURAL
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and banks began issuing credit cards in the late-1950s.77 After over twenty years
of increasing numbers of credit cardholders, revolving credit still only accounted
for 3.8% of total consumer credit outstanding in 1970.78 Usury laws in each state
banned the extension of credit to higher-risk borrowers, restricting the pool of
potential customers.79
For multiple reasons,80 consumer lending to higher-risk customers became
more profitable over time.81 One important turning point came in 1978 when the
Supreme Court held that national banks could follow the interest rates permitted
in the state where they were headquartered, which caused states to repeal usury
laws and national banks to move to states with lenient rates.82 In 1996, the
Supreme Court extended this rule to fees.83 As a result, credit card companies
could raise interest rates, fees, and penalties, making lending to lower-income
and riskier borrowers incredibly profitable.84 Subsequently, the secondary
market became efficient, the supply of credit increased, and the demand for
credit exploded.85
Today, credit cards are abundant amongst even lower-income households.86
For very low-income households, making less than $10,000 per year, credit card
debt increased by 184% from 1989 to 2001.87 In 1989, 27.6% of households in the
bottom 25% by net worth had credit card balances; by 2007, 41% had credit card
balances.88 Another factor contributing to this increase was the easing of the
application process – applications for credit cards can now be completed at home
through online websites, telephone, or postal mail solicitations.89 In 2011, credit
HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 17 (1999).
77. Lander, supra note 19, at 204.
78. Glenn B. Canner & Gregory Elliehausen, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Consumer Experiences with Credit Cards, 99 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 6 (2013), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2013/pdf/consumer-experiences-with-credit-cards201312.pdf. Revolving debt is primarily comprised of credit card debt. Id.
79. Lander, supra note 19, at 204.
80. See id. at 204–05 (discussing lenient usury laws, high inflation in the late 1970’s, legislative
atmosphere, changes in legal precedent, Bankruptcy Reform Act, increased volume, oligopolization
and consolidation of competitors into a handful of credit card lenders, sophistication in credit
scoring).
81. Id. at 205.
82. Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978);
Freeman, supra note 76, at 159.
83. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Freeman, supra note 76, at 159–60;
Lupica, supra note 18, at 581.
84. See Lupica, supra note 18, at 580–82 (noting that low-risk, affluent, middle-class clients paid
off their balances within the grace period resulting in less income from interest rates, so a shift to
soliciting lower-income households who could not payoff debt in full would lead to increased
profits).
85. Lander, supra note 19, at 205.
86. Lupica, supra note 18, at 583.
87. TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE GROWTH
OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE '90S 10 (2003), available at http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/
publications/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet.pdf.
88. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 2013 SUMMARY OF CONSUMER FINANCES
CHARTBOOK 1188 (2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/files/Bulletin
Charts.pdf. The same percentage decreased after the recession to 33.4% of households in 2013. Id.
89. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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issuers sent nearly five billion direct mail solicitations, nearly 40% more than in
2010.90 According to MasterCard Advisors, the professional services arm of
MasterCard Worldwide, 52% of new credit card acquirers applied online, 18% by
postal mail, 12% by mobile device, 8% by telephone, and 6% by other means.91
Households who file for bankruptcy receive disproportionately more credit
offers per month than the average household.92
Greater availability of credit as well as home solicitation offers assist
abusers in coercing their victims into coerced debt. 93 Angela Littwin explains
that coerced debt is either achieved through fraud, force, or “misinformation and
other means.” Coerced debt by fraud would include impersonation, forgery, and
identity theft. By applying online, sending in a form via mail, or speaking to a
representative over the phone, the abuser can create an account using the
victim’s social security number and personal information.94 Littwin notes, “[T]he
types of information that lenders currently require to prevent identity theft are
only useful in screening out strangers, not intimate relations.”95 The abuser can
also charge items to the victim’s accounts if the abuser knows the victim’s credit
card and billing information. Coerced debt by force includes using threats of
physical violence or other extremely negative consequences, like harming the
victim’s children or reporting the victim for immigration-related violations.96
Coerced debt by “misinformation and other means” is a sort of catch-all for
behaviors that do not fit in the two prior categories. Examples include using
language barriers to trick victims into signing documents, generating debt under
a joint, married household knowing the victim will be liable, and destroying a
victim’s property that is collateral for loans.97
B. The Value of Credit Cards and Financial Freedom for Victim Safety
Credit cards do not necessarily harm all domestic violence victims. In
reality, credit cards can assist in providing a social safety net for domestic
violence victims, especially when they first leave the abusive environment.
Credit cards can serve to “enhance or maintain their productivity (e.g., to start a
business, invest in an education, or subsist until new employment is found), to
90. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE
PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 8 (2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/ccprofit2012.pdf.
91. MARGOT VAUGHAN, MASTERCARD ADVISORS, HOW ISSUES CAN GET, KEEP, AND GROW THE
OMNICHANNEL CUSTOMER 2 (2014), available at http://www.mastercardadvisors.com/campaign/
DMA2014/Responsive_Marketing_Whitepaper.pdf.
92. Katherine Porter, Bankrupt Profits: The Credit Industry's Business Model for Postbankruptcy
Lending, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1369, 1393–94 (2008) (“The average bankrupt household in the sample
reported receiving fifteen offers each month, 2.5 times the number directed to the average
nonbankrupt family.”).
93. See Littwin, Beyond Usury, supra note 17, at 453 (explaining the increased availability of credit
over the past ten years).
94. See Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 986 (“[B]anks used to require face-to-face meetings
in order to authorize personal lines of credit. These meetings . . . limited the ways in which one
person could fraudulently obtain a loan in the name of the other.”).
95. Id. at 987.
96. Id. at 989–90.
97. Id. at 990–9.1
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consume, and to provide a measure of income security or insurance in times of
enhanced risk.”98 When a financial crisis hits, credit cards can be used to pay for
necessities like food, shelter, or medicine.99 The three main reasons cited by
bankruptcy filers as causes of their bankruptcy are job loss, medical illness, and
divorce.100 Individuals can and often rely on their credit cards to “fill the gaps in
the safety net to cover expenses when these sorts of financial calamities occur.”101
Researchers have also shown that low-income families rely significantly on credit
cards during times of unanticipated financial crisis.102 If a domestic violence
victim’s credit has been destroyed due to coerced debt, that domestic violence
victim has less liquidity to handle financial crises or to find financial freedom
from her abuser.103
III. SURVEY OF CREDIT CARD ISSUERS’ POLICIES FOR COERCED DEBT: DATA &
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of the study was to survey credit card issuers’ policies for
responding to coerced debt. This study consisted of phone interviews with
customer service representatives from each of the top twenty issuers of credit
card debt in the United States.104
A. Subject Selection
I consulted The Nilson Report, a payment-industry publication, for a list of
the top credit card issuers. Although The Nilson Report uses proprietary
information and does not generally disclose its sources,105 government
agencies106 and numerous academics107 have relied on this source for statistics on
98. Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the Social
Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217, 1227 (2004).
99. Id.
100. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS
MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81 (2003).
101. Jean Braucher, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers & Fathers Are Going Broke
Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 193, 209 (2004) (book review).
102. Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients
and A Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 548–49 (2013) (finding that low-income families use
credit cards for approximately 70% financial shock events in comparison to turning to families or
friends, earned income tax credit, unemployment insurance, welfare, or private charities).
103. Even beyond these financial shocks, credit cards support families during times of
unexpected financial strain and even “cyclical borrowing” typical of “a consumer lifestyle” where a
household’s expenses temporarily exceed revenues, like Christmas or the beginning of school terms.
Austin, supra note 98, at 1227.
104. Infra Part III.A.
105. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 58 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Priceless].
106. See e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-225, CREDIT CARDS: MARKETING TO
COLLEGE STUDENTS APPEARS TO HAVE DECLINED 3 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter GAO, CREDIT CARDS],
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/661121.pdf (citing The Nilson Report as source for
identifying the high volume of credit card issuances for purposes of the study); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE PROFITABILITY OF CREDIT CARD OPERATIONS
OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 6 n.8 (2014) [hereinafter BD. OF GOVERNORS, PROFITABILITY REPORT]
(citing The Nilson Report as source for information on number of cards VISA, MasterCard, American
Express, and Discover Card Services provided in 2013).
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the American card industry. For instance, when the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) prepared a report for Congress on the marketing of
credit cards to college students, the GAO relied on The Nilson Report to identify
“the five largest general credit card issuers.”108 Ronald J. Mann, a Columbia Law
School professor, and Adam J. Levitin, a Georgetown Law professor, are leading
consumer law scholars, and both have relied on The Nilson Report to conduct
their research on the payment industry.109 I followed their lead.
According to The Nilson Report, the largest issuers of consumer Visa and
MasterCard110 credit cards based on consumer purchase volume in 2013 were
(ordered by their descending share of the market): JPMorgan Chase, Bank of
America, Citi, Capital One, U.S. Bank, Barclays, Wells Fargo, USAA, Cabela’s
WFB, GE Capital Retail Bank,111 Navy FCU, PNC, First National Nebraska, TD
Bank, Nordstrom, ICBA Bancard, Fifth Third, BB&T, State Farm, and Pentagon
FCU.112 The top four companies, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citi, and
107. According to a WestlawNext search, The Nilson Report had been cited in 64 law journal
articles at the time of publication. See also, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the
United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1108 (2002) (“I rely throughout this paper on the Nilson
Report for statistics regarding the American card industry. Although the source of the statistics
published in the Nilson Report is rarely clear, I follow the lead of American government agencies and
earlier academics, which generally have accepted them as authoritative.”); Adam J. Levitin, The
Antitrust Super Bowl: America's Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 265, 271 tbls. 1 & 2 (2005) [hereinafter Levitin, Antitrust Super Bowl] (creating tables
on U.S. transactions by payment method using The Nilson Report data); Michael S. Barr, Banking the
Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 204 (2004) (“The Nilson Report predicts that debit card transactions will
surpass credit card transactions in the next decade.”); Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit
Card Interest Rate Regulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 201, 224 tbl. 2 (1986) (citing The Nilson Report for credit
card issuers statistics in 1984).
108. GAO, CREDIT CARDS, supra note 106, at 3 n. 7 .
109. Mann, supra note 107, at 1108; Levitin, Antitrust Super Bowl, supra note 107, at 271.
110. I chose to limit the survey to only issuers of Visa and MasterCard credit cards for multiple
reasons. First, Visa and Mastercard-labeled cards constituted 432 million general purpose credit cards
provided in 2013, dominating the majority of the market. BD. OF GOVERNORS, PROFITABILITY REPORT,
supra note 106, at 6. Therefore, by including only these two networks’ issuers, this study will reflect
the experience of a majority of credit card customers. Second, the system of credit card issuing,
acquiring, and network associations is complex. Visa and MasterCard do not issue credit card
accounts but instead rely on third-party banks and institutions to issue their cards to customers.
Levitin, Priceless, supra note 105, at 1328. In contrast, American Express and Discover have historically
issued their respective credit cards. Id. American Express and Discover have begun to contract with
third-party banks, including Visa and MasterCard member banks, but both still issue a significant
amount of cards on their own. Alan S. Frankel & Allan L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of
Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 627, 663 (2006). The dynamics between customers, issuers,
acquirers, and networks are intricate. Issuers can negotiate with networks and voice the collective
concerns of their customers and merchants. Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute
Resolution in the Card Context: Structure, Reputation, and Incentives, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 393, 429–30
(2005). Since American Express and Discover are both issuers and networks, their behavior as issuers
may be different. To include American Express and Discover as issuers in this study is outside of this
study’s scope and my level of expertise. For these reasons, I excluded American Express and Discover
as issuers from this study.
111. GE Capital Retail Bank is now named Synchrony Financial, but I will refer to it as GE
Capital in this paper. Michael J. De La Merced, G.E. Files to Spin Off Retail Finance Unit, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2014, 8:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/g-e-files-to-spin-off-retailfinance-unit/?_r=0.
112. HSN Consultants, Inc., Top U.S. Consumer Credit/Debit Issuers, THE NILSON REP., August
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Capital One, issued the vast majority of credit cards in America.113 Surveying
these companies alone would provide information on $856.5 billion of consumer
purchase volume in 2013.114 Instead, I chose to survey the top twenty issuers of
credit cards to compare results across a more diverse range of issuers, including
nonprofit credit unions,115 retail store-affiliated banks,116 and a financial
institution for military families.117
B. Methodology and Data Collection
The phone interviews loosely followed a script.118 I called each credit card
issuer’s customer service number listed on their websites119 and told each
representative that I was a domestic violence advocate who sought information
on behalf of my domestic violence clients.120 In addition to asking about the
company’s general policies for domestic violence, I asked what the protocol
would be for two specific scenarios: (a) the first client, Client A, discovered that
her abusive ex-partner had opened a credit card account in her name using her
personal information without her knowledge, and (b) the second client, Client B,
was forced to open a credit card account by her abusive ex-partner, and then the
ex-partner charged a significant amount of debt on that account against her will.
I chose these two scenarios to compare the reaction of representatives to coerced
debt by fraud (Client A) and coerced debt by force (Client B) as defined by
Angela Littwin.121 I called each company twice using the same script.
As stated previously, the purpose of the study was to observe credit card
issuers’ responses to coerced debt of their clients. I chose to interview credit card
issuers’ customer service representatives, because this method would offer at
least an initial glimpse into how credit card issuers train their representatives.
Because individual representatives may not adequately portray the companies’
actual policies and protocols, this study was only introductory. Nonetheless,
representatives’ responses may still carry informative and legal weight.122 I
2014, at 1, 10 tbl. “Largest U.S. Issuers of Consumer Visa and Mastercard Cards 2013.”
113. The amount of consumer purchase volume for JP Morgan Chase, $364.86 billion, is more
than the total amount, $273.27 billion, that the sixteen credit card issuers ranked fifth to twentieth
issued. Id.
114. Id.
115. Pentagon FCU.
116. Nordstrom, Cabelas WFB.
117. USAA.
118. See infra app. A.
119. For example, JP Morgan Chase bank lists one phone number on the Customer Service
webpage for its credit card products. See Chase Credit Card Customer Service, J.P. MORGAN CHASE &
CO., https://www.chase.com/credit-cards/customer-service (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). First
National of Nebraska lists a specific number on its website for “Credit Card Customer Service.” See
Contact Us, FIRST NAT’L BANK, https://www.firstnational.com/RetailWeb/default/contactus
/SHOW_FORM/form (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). BB&T lists a phone number directly on its credit
card-specific page. See Credit Cards from BB&T, BB&T, http://www.bbt.com/bbtdotcom/banking/
credit-cards/default.page (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
120. The companies and customer service representatives were not notified that they were the
subject of a study.
121. Littwin, Coerced Debt, supra note 12, at 986–90.
122. See John Leubsdorf, Evidence Law As A System of Incentives, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1621, 1627 (2010)
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tracked the representatives’ responses, including whether their employees
transferred me to a supervisor or legal department, provided detailed
instructions for contesting coerced debt, or claimed that the company did not
have a policy for responding to domestic violence. Since the topic of domestic
violence may be offensive or traumatizing, I did not fabricate or discuss details
involving physical violence, sexual abuse, or other disturbing issues. I sought to
minimize any risk to the welfare of the subject customer service
representatives.123
C. Results124
1. Domestic Violence Policy or Protocol
None of the representatives identified that their company had a written
policy or protocol to respond to issues of domestic violence. On the first round of

(“Likewise, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) . . . allows an employers' opponent to use
employees' statements, when they were made during their employment and are about a matter
within their employment's scope, against the employer.”); Felicia Ruth Reid, Ethical Limitations on
Investigating Employment Discrimination Claims: The Prohibition on Ex Parte Contact with A Defendant's
Employees, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1991) (“Since employment discrimination occurs in the
workplace, fellow employees will be a plaintiff's major witnesses and will possess information crucial
to her case.”). In the housing and lending discrimination context, nonprofits have hired individuals to
test whether individual employees or agents of a landlord or lender would treat people of different
backgrounds, including race, familial status, and so on, discriminately, and courts have continually
approved of this testing to prove discrimination claims. Liam Garland, Reflections on Housing Rights
Center v. Krug, 41 URB. LAW. 249, 249–56 (2009); Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage
Lending Discrimination Cases, 41 URB. LAW. 319 (2009).
123. The probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort of the representatives anticipated in
the research are no greater than those ordinarily encountered in daily life. I did not record identifying
information about the representatives. I only recorded the first name of representatives to ensure that
I did not speak to the same individual on subsequent calls to the same company. Since the subject
companies are large corporations, it is unlikely that a first name will be able to identify an individual
if this information was released. I also did not record conversations on an audio or visual recording
device for similar reasons. Instead, I transcribed the conversations during the interviews to the best of
my ability and immediately reviewed my notes for errors after concluding the interview.
124. On the first round of calls, representatives from two issuers, Barclays and ICBA Bancard,
refused to speak with me even regarding general information. On the second round of calls, more
representatives refused to speak to me, including GE Capital, First National Nebraska, US Bank and
Bank of America. During the first round, the Barclays representative said he could only speak to me
with formal authorization from the domestic violence victims. The Barclays representative told me to
go to the company’s website for general questions. When I asked where on the website I should look,
the Barclays representative immediately responded, “I need to speak to the cardholder to answer
that.” The ICBA Bancard representatives on each round of calls claimed that they are “just the
provider,” so the domestic violence victims should contact whatever bank is getting business from
her credit card. According to the ICBA Bancard website, the company offers banks two credit card
programs: (1) “Direct Issuing,” which permits banks to issue their own credit cards while ICBA
Bancard offers “fraud protection, 24-hour customer service, a rewards program, and more”; and (2)
“Total Card Management” program, where banks can offer ICBA Bancard’s cards “branded with
your own, [the bank’s], logo” but through TCM Bank, N.A., a subsidiary bank of ICBA Bancard.
Credit
Card
Solutions,
ICBA
BANCARD
&
TCM
BANK,
http://www.icbabancard.com/productservices/index.cfm?ItemNumber=54428&navItemNumber=5
3373 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015); About TCM, Bank, N.A., ICBA BANCARD & TCM BANK,
http://www.icbabancard.com/About/index.cfm?ItemNumber=53413&navItemNumber=53318 (last
visited Feb. 17, 2015).
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calls, thirteen representatives explicitly stated that no policy existed or that they
were unaware of any such policy. Five representatives stated that their company
had policies for credit card terms and conditions, identity theft, or fraud, but
none of these policies explicitly mention domestic violence or coerced debt. On
the second round of calls, twelve representatives explicitly stated that no policy
existed or they were unaware of any policy. Six representatives refused to
answer whether a policy existed or whether they knew or did not know of any
policy. No representative directed me to a general credit card policy on terms
and conditions identity theft, or fraud.
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Table 1. Credit Card Issuers’ Domestic Violence-Specific Policies
1

Issuers from Round 1

2

Issuers from Round 2

Representative
stated that
company had
no domestic
violence policy
or that they did
not know of one

13

Chase, Bank of
America, Citi, US
Bank, Wells Fargo,
USAA, Cabela’s WFB,
GE Capital, Fifth
Third, BB&T, State
Farm, Pentagon FCU,
Capital One

12

Chase, Barclays,
USAA, Cabela’s, Navy
FCU, TD Bank, State
Farm, Nordstrom, PNC,
Fifth Third, BB&T,
Pentagon FCU

Representative
would not
disclose
whether the
company had a
domestic
violence policy
or whether they
knew of any
policy
Representative
said company
had written
policy but
directed me to
general card use
terms and
conditions,
policies for
identity theft,
charges, or
fraud.
I did not ask if
company had a
domestic
violence policy

0

6

Bank of America,
Capital One, US Bank,
First National
Nebraska, Citi, Wells
Fargo

5

Navy FCU, PNC, First
National Nebraska,
Nordstrom, BB&T

0

3

TD Bank, ICBA
Bancard, Barclays

2

GE Capital, ICBA
Bancard

2. Options for Victims of Coerced Debt by Fraud or Force
I received ranging and conflicting responses from representatives for what
Clients A and B should expect upon calling to report their coerced debt issues.125
Although Client A involved an individual opening an account using another
person’s personal information, representatives identified Client A’s scenario in

125. Certain representatives were resistant to answering questions. If a company is not
mentioned in the results, then that company was not asked the pertinent question.

Kim_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

6/3/2015 7:50 PM

CREDIT CARDS: WEAPONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

297

varied ways. On the first round of calls, five representatives identified Client A’s
situation as identity theft, thirteen identified it as fraud, and two stated that there
was no way for a client to dispute or that the client would be held responsible for
the account’s activity. Capital One’s representative said it would likely be
identity theft but it may also implicate fraud if the abuser used the same account
to incur debt. On the second round of calls, multiple issuers’ representatives gave
different answers from the initial round of calls. On the second round, three
companies’ representatives identified Client A’s scenario as an identity theft
claim, but none of these three companies are the same companies from the first
round of calls. Similarly, twelve representatives identified Client A’s situation as
a fraud claim, but four represent companies that had answered differently in the
first round of calls. Most importantly though, two new companies’
representatives, BB&T and State Farm, stated that Client A could not dispute the
account or would be held responsible for the account charges. BB&T and State
Farm had previously stated during the first round that Client A could dispute
under a fraud or identity theft claim.
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Table 2. Credit Card Issuers’ Responses to Coerced Debt by Fraud
Round
1 Total

Representative
said Client A
is/similar to
identity theft
claim
Representative
said Client A
is/similar to
fraud claim

Representative
said Client A can
dispute charges
(but did not
identify claim as
fraud or identity
theft)
Representative
refused to
comment on
whether Client B
identity
theft/fraud/can
dispute
Representative
said there is no
way Client A can
dispute or said
she will be held
responsible or
put into a
payment plan

5

13

Issuers from
Round 1
State Farm, PNC,
Wells Fargo,
Capital One, Bank
of America

Round 2
Total

Chase, Citi, Capital
One, US Bank,
USAA, TD Bank,
First National
Nebraska, Navy
FCU, Cabela’s
WFB, Fifth Third,
BB&T, Nordstrom,
GE Capital

12

0

3

1

Issuers from
Round 2
USAA, Navy
FCU, TD Bank

Chase, Citi,
Capital One, US
Bank, USAA,
Cabela’s WFB,
Pentagon FCU,
Nordstrom, Bank
of America,
Barclays, Wells
Fargo, PNC
Fifth Third

2

Barclays, ICBA
Bancard

3

GE Capital, First
National
Nebraska

2

Pentagon FCU,
Capital One

2

BB&T, State
Farm

Responses to Client B were also inconsistent. In the first round of calls, two
representatives identified Client B’s situation as identity theft, and eight
considered it fraud. Five representatives stated that Client B can dispute charges
on the account but did not identify the scenario as fraud or identity theft, and
four said that the Client could not dispute the account or charges and would
likely be held responsible. In contrast, on the second round of calls ten
representatives identified Client B’s situation as a fraud claim, one identified it as
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an identity theft issue, and two representatives stated that Client B would be
responsible for the account.
Representatives that claimed that Client B will likely be held responsible
ranged in how they discussed this point. During the first call to Fifth Third, the
representative stated, “No, she’d be solely responsible. If you give someone
permission to use your card you’ve given permission, so you are responsible.
You’re the primary account holder.” The Fifth Third representative said fraud
would not apply and that there were no exceptions for domestic violence
victims. On the second call to BB&T, the representative discussed Client A and B
together, saying “They are responsible. If it’s a BB&T card, they have to sign for
it. If their name is on the account, then they had to sign for it, and they’re
responsible.” When I asked what “sign for it means” and whether she means
sign for each transaction or for the credit card application itself, the
representative said both. I asked if an individual could apply for a card online,
and the representative responded, “Yes, you can apply for a credit card online,
but you have to sign electronically. So, even if it’s forced, she still gave
authorization.”
Table 3. Credit Card Issuers’ Responses to Coerced Debt by Force
Round 1
Total

Issuers from
Round 1
State Farm, Wells
Fargo

Round 2
Total

Representative
said Client B
is/similar to
identity theft
claim
Representative
said Client B
is/similar to
fraud claim

2

1

8

Chase, Bank of
America, US
Bank, Cabela’s
WFB, BB&T,
Navy FCU, GE
Capital, TD Bank

10

Representative
said Client B can
dispute charges
(but did not
identify claim as
fraud or identity
theft)
Representative
refused to
comment on
whether Client B
identity
theft/fraud/can

5

Fifth Third, PNC,
Citi, Nordstrom,
First National
Nebraska

3

3

USAA, Barclays,
ICBA Bancard

3

Issuers from
Round 2
TD Bank

Chase, Bank of
America, Citi,
Capital One,
US Bank,
Barclays, Wells
Fargo, USAA,
PNC,
Nordstrom
Cabela’s WFB,
Fifth Third,
Pentagon FCU

GE Capital,
Navy FCU,
First National
Nebraska
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dispute

Representative
said there is no
way Client B can
dispute or said
she will be held
responsible or
put into a
payment plan

4

Pentagon FCU,
Fifth Third,
Nordstrom,
Capital One

2

BB&T, State
Farm

3. Police Involvement and Mandatory Reporting
For both Clients A and B, policies regarding police involvement were also
inconsistent across issuers and internally within companies as representatives
shifted positions during calls. For the first round of calls regarding Client A, five
representatives said that Client A would likely be required to file a police report
if she wanted to challenge the account,126 four recommended that Client A file a
police report but did not say it was required,127 and four said that the report was
not required or especially recommended.128 Capital One’s representative gave
inconsistent information. She explained that the company “cannot take so many
actions unless the victim initiates a police report.” When I asked what would
happen if Client A filed a police report, the representative said, “That’s different.
We are the one who is going to take action on the person who committed theft.
But I will be asking her.” I asked whether the company would intervene in the
police report complaint, and the representative replied, “Sometimes it’s difficult
to take action on the person who committed the theft. If she opens police report,
she does not have to. The police can share the information. We cannot take
action.” In comparison, JP Morgan Chase’s representative said the company may
file a police report on its own without Client A’s consent. I asked if Client A can
prevent the police from being involved, especially if she feared for her safety,
and the representative said, “I can see the fear, but to protect her, we would
pursue those charges– not her. . . I’ve seen that scenario play out. It’s
unfortunate, but at the same time, from our standpoint, we want to help the
person being victimized.”
In the second round of calls, two representatives said that Client A would
likely be required to file a police report if she wanted to challenge the account,129
one recommended that Client A file a police report but did not say it was

126. TD Bank, First National of Nebraska, Cabela’s WFB, and USAA. Citi’s representative said
that a police report would be necessary if only a few numbers in her identification (i.e., social security
number) were incorrect on the account application.
127. State Farm, BB&T, Navy Federal Credit Union, and Bank of America.
128. PNC, GE Capital, and Wells Fargo. Citi’s representatives said that if the fraudulent account’s
application was opened with her personal information without any errors then she would not be
required to file a police report.
129. Wells Fargo and TD Bank.
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required,130 and five said that the report was not required or especially
recommended.131 By contrast, USAA and TD Bank’s representatives stated
during the second round of calls that the company would file police charges
against the abuser without discussing Client A’s consent. TD Bank’s
representative explained, “If she doesn’t press charges, then TD will. . . . Police is
going to be involved either way. If she don’t do it, it’ll be on her credit report.
She’ll be held liable, and she’ll have to pay it off.”
During the first round of calls, in Client B’s situation, three representatives
said that Client B would be required to file a police report to challenge the
account,132 three said that they would recommend but would not require Client B
to report,133 and three did not indicate whether a police report was required or
recommended.134 Citi and JP Morgan Chase representatives said that their
companies may pursue police charges against the abuser without Client B’s
consent. Citi’s representative explained that fees may shift to Client B for the cost
of investigating her claim:
[Citi] may also ask the law enforcement agencies to take some action. That will
be done by Citibank. The customer will have nothing to do with this. . . . she will
be kept in the loop throughout the investigation. She will be sent out a letter
anytime something happens. So, if an investigation will be raised, then a letter
will be sent out saying: ‘You asked us to investigate so and so issues.’ If the
investigation results in her favor, she will not have to pay for anything. If
otherwise, she may have to pay for that. But she can be sure that we will have
documented proof of everything that we do.

Lastly, two representatives would not provide an answer.135
On the second round of calls, representatives from Wells Fargo and TD
Bank said that Client B would likely be required to file a police report to contest
the account, and three representatives recommended that Client B file a police
report but did not say it was required by company policy.136 Finally, the same
representatives, from USAA and TD Bank, that identified that their companies
may file police reports without Client A’s consent applied the same rule in Client
B’s situations as well.
4. Credit Card Representatives’ Emotional Responses to Domestic
Violence
While most representatives remained neutral during the interviews,
refraining from commenting on the domestic violence scenarios, some shared
personal stories or expressed empathy or kindness towards Clients A and B.137
During the first round of calls, a representative from one of the top four issuers138

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Chase.
Capital One, Barclays, PNC, State Farm, and Nordstrom.
State Farm, First National of Nebraska, and Cabela’s WFB.
BB&T, Navy Federal Credit Union, and Bank of America.
GE Capital, Wells Fargo, and Capital One.
PNC and USAA.
Chase, PNC, and Fifth Third.
See Part C.3., supra.
Since this may be more detrimental to the representatives, I will not name the
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explained, “From personal experience, when it comes to things like that, I went
to the police department. They kept an eye out for me and protected me. I would
file a police report and see if there’s anything they can do to put a restraining
order so that way they can be safe from any danger.” She also stated that talking
about abusive relationships “can be embarrassing” and that she would be happy
to talk to them because she is “not going to judge anybody.” Another
representative from a top four issuer divulged, “Yeah, I mean, I have seen some
of it in my own life – which is why I am trying to give you as much information
as I can. So you know what to do going forward.” In addition, during the second
round of calls, representatives from two other companies shared personal
experiences. One representative stated, “When somebody’s been through that,
it’s hard to know what to do. I do know more about that stuff, because it’s stuff
that I’ve lived through so I know.” A representative from another company,
while explaining that police reports may be problematic but necessary to free the
clients from their debt, also stated, “I know DV is a touchy situation, I totally
understand. I’ve been in that situation before.”
In addition, some representatives recommended that Client A or B
downplay their domestic violence stories when they contact the issuer
companies. A representative from one of the top four issuers recommended that
Client B not discuss the domestic violence issues when disputing her account
activity. The representative said:
[The issuer] may not give her a credit for the entire amount. We may say that we
cannot dispute this charge, so ask her not to disclose everything. . . . they don’t
need to know the entire story. . . . I understand what the situation is. As an
organization, you also know, our company would not help people with these
kinds of situations and these kinds of charges on this account. . . . You know the
internal culture or organization’s mentality.

Another representative from a top four issuer explained that the clients
“don’t have to go in depth” when they make their initial call.
On the second round of calls, two representatives shared similar sentiments.
One representative from a top four issuer explained that, if the client does not
want her abuser to be notified or charged with crime against her will, the client
should not share details on the situations and just request that the account be
closed. The representative stated, “I wouldn’t share information if they are just
wanting to close the account if they don’t want police involved in it. . . . I would
have to report.” A representative from a smaller institution stated that, when the
clients call to dispute charges or open a fraud claim, they do not need to explain
the situation. The representative said, “It can be done without a – why certain
things happened. They can just file it as a dispute and we would go ahead and
do that. They don’t have to say anything.”
5. Elder Abuse Protocols
The topic of elder financial abuse arose naturally in interviews. In both the
first and second round of calls, Wells Fargo’s representatives explained that, if
Client A or B is elderly, the company’s policy would be different since Wells

representative’s company but will identify the issuers’ rank according to The Nilson Report.
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Fargo has either “specific forms for elder abuse” or an abuse reporting protocol.
At the end of the first conversation, I asked if he knew if Wells Fargo commonly
received domestic abuse-related calls from customers. He said no, but he
explained that it was “not uncommon” to find that “the person you’re talking to
on the phone sounds like they are elderly, who might be getting taken advantage
of.” He said that if he can tell that an elderly person is “being pushed,” then that
is something Wells Fargo will respond to immediately. Capital One’s
representative said similar comments. She explained, “We’re used to receiving
elderly situations with elderly people. That’s handled in a different way. That’s
pretty common.”
Five days after my interview with the Bank of America representative, I
received a call from a different Bank of America representative. She explained
that she received “a report about financial abuse” and that her call was “in
reference to an elder abuse report that you submitted for a client.” I explained
that I did not indicate anytime during my conversation with the Bank of America
representative that my clients were elderly and that I did not submit an elder
abuse report. That representative stated that that is what she had received but
that she would close the report. Although this conversation did not occur during
my initial call, it nonetheless illustrates how the call was interpreted and
responded to by the initial representative.
D. Discussion
Across the issues of identity theft, fraud, account disputes, police reports,
and police intervention, the only consistent theme throughout the interviews was
that there is no consistency across the top credit card issuers in responding to
coerced debt. It is unclear whether the representatives’ responses were affected
by discussions of domestic violence or whether these responses are generally
how representatives respond to issues of identity theft and fraud. Further study
is needed to compare how an issuer responds to individuals who do not identify
as domestic violence victims and to individuals who do, using otherwise
identical stories for each individual. Furthermore, it is unknown whether the
responses of each individual representative are indicative of the company’s
general policy. Multiple series of this survey, or a similar survey, could be run on
the same issuers to further investigate representatives’ responses.139 What is clear
is that the representatives that discussed elder abuse and credit card issuer
policies appeared to have clear directions, and even special forms, on how to
respond to the issue of financial abuse and even credit card debt coerced by the
elder’s relatives. More research is needed to understand whether domestic
violence and elder abuse share any similarities, and if so, the benefits or
challenges of integrating their models.

139. Since a more extensive survey was not conducted , discussion of identity theft and fraud
lack analytical foundation from these interviews.
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IV. BACKGROUND AND COMPARISON OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ELDER ABUSE
MOVEMENTS
A. An Emphasis on Safety Versus an Emphasis on Finances
The domestic violence movement did not emerge as a national movement
until the late 1960s and 1970s.140 Domestic violence had not previously been
recognized by the criminal justice system as a matter of concern.141 The early
domestic violence movement distrusted the state, and instead, focused on
providing services and shelter to victims outside of state involvement.142
Advocates later committed to changing laws and policies, under the belief that it
was necessary for systemic change.143 Advocates pushed for access to civil
protection orders against abusers.144 From 1976 to 1992, all fifty states enacted
legislation for civil protection orders.145
While domestic violence advocates in the 1970s pursued a national
organized effort and created shelters and other services for victims, elder abuse
did not reach a national audience until 1981.146 In 1981, the United States House
of Representatives Select Committee on Aging published a breakthrough report
on elder abuse, defining the nature and extent of elder abuse.147 The report
estimated that approximately one million elders were abused each year.148
An important distinction between the early elder abuse and domestic
violence movements is that the elder abuse movement initially saw financial
abuse as its central issue. The aforementioned House Committee report
explained that “[p]hysical violence including negligence [as] the most common
form of abuse, followed by financial abuse”149 and that it “developed literally

140. Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect
Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 499, 500 (2003). See also McFarlane, supra note 29,
at 5 (“It was not until the women's liberation movement in the late 1960's and 1970's that the problem
of domestic violence began to receive adequate attention.”).
141. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (2004); McFarlane, supra note 29, at 4–5 (“In 1882, Maryland
became the first state to criminalize wife abuse.”).
142. Sack, supra note 141, at 1666 (2004); Murphy, supra note 140, at 500–01 (“[Advocates] saw the
state as maintaining, enforcing, and legitimizing male violence against women . . . Groups rejected
governmental funding for battered women's services and programs.”). Police officers “frequently
ignored domestic violence calls or purposefully delayed responding for several hours.” Joan Zorza,
The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47
(1992).
143. Sack, supra note 141 at 1667; Murphy, supra note 140 , at 500–02.
144. Sack, supra note 141 at 1667.
145. Murphy, supra note140, at 502.
146. See Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect-the Legal
Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 82–83 (1998) (highlighting a rise in public and professional
recognition of abuse throughout the 1960s and 1970s).
147. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 97TH CONG., ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A HIDDEN
PROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981); Charles Pratt, Banks' Effectiveness at Reporting Financial Abuse of Elders:
An Assessment and Recommendations for Improvements in California, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 195, 230 (2003);
Moskowitz, supra note 146, at 83.
148. Moskowitz, supra note 146, at 83.
149. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, supra note 147, at xv.
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thousands of examples which [fell] into the category of financial exploitation.”150
Unlike the studies on domestic violence, there have been numerous studies on
the prevalence of elder financial exploitation since 1981.151
The statutory definition of elder abuse varies in each state, but generally,
elder abuse encompasses “neglect and physical, psychological, fiduciary, and
sexual abuse or exploitation.”152 Financial abuse of an elder can include an array
of conduct, including “‘fraud, false pretenses, embezzlement, conspiracy,
forgery, falsifying records, coerced property transfers or denial of access to
assets,’ as well as undue influence and abuse of fiduciary relationships.”153
For over twenty years, banks have been identified as a “first line of defense”
against financial exploitation of elders.154 Banks are able to identify unusual
activity on an elder’s bank account, including sharp increases in debt or unusual
spending patterns or sudden withdrawals.155 In the 1990s, Massachusetts created
“the first major public/private partnership on a statewide level involving the
banking industry.”156 This partnership enlisted 173 banks and published manuals
for bank employees to identify, respond to, and thwart elder financial
exploitation.157 This model has been replicated in several states.158
States have also enacted statutes requiring bank employees to report elder
financial abuse. Nine states have enacted reporting statutes that explicitly
mention or require reporting by bank employees.159 Seventeen other states
require reporting by any individual, but these states did not identify banks
specifically.160
150. Id. at 13.
151. See John C. Craft, Preventing Power of Attorney Abuse-A Lawyer's Role, 75 ALA. LAW. 116, 118
(2014) (“[E]lderly victims are not likely to report financial exploitation. Numerous studies have been
conducted attempting to estimate the number of cases never reported to authorities.”).
152. Clarissa Bryan, Beyond Bedsores: Investigating Suspicious Deaths, Self-Inflicted Injuries, and
Science in a Coroner System, 7 NAELA J. 199, 202 (Fall 2011).
153. Jessica Coombs, Scamming the Elderly: An Increased Susceptibility to Financial Exploitation
Within and Outside of the Family, 7 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 243, 245 (2014). Typically, relatives or caretakers
perpetrate the abuse, but strangers sometimes commit it as well. Id. Examples include telemarketer
scams, sweepstakes, disaster scams, and identity theft. Id.
154. Pratt, supra note 147, at 229.
155. Sandra L. Hughes, Can Bank Tellers Tell?-Legal Issues Related to Banks Reporting Financial Abuse
of the Elderly, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 293, 294 (2004).
156. Gillian Price & Craig Fox, The Massachusetts Bank Reporting Project: An Edge Against Elder
Financial Exploitation, 8 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 59, 62–69 (1997).
157. Id. at 65–66.
158. See Hughes, supra note 155, at 303-04 (discussing similar projects in Oregon, California, and
New York); see also James H. Pietsch, Elder Abuse and Laws to Protect Older Persons in Hawaii, 16 HAW.
B.J. 93, 110 n.6 (2013) (discussing The Elder Justice Act, aimed at “ensuring adequate public-private
infrastructure and resolving to prevent, detect, treat, understand, and intervene in, and where
appropriate, aid in the prosecution of, elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation.”).
159. See the following states’ statutes, mandating reporting by bank employees: Ark. Code Ann. §
12-12-1708(a)–(c) (2013); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-1903(a)(1) (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 415.1034 (2003); Ga.
Code Ann. § 30-5-4 (2002); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-1431 (2002); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-47-7 (2003); see also
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 26-3.1-102 (2003) (urging but not mandating bank employees to report); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 346-224(a)(2) (2009) (“Employees or officers of any public or private agency or institution
providing social, medical, hospital or mental health services, including financial assistance”).
160. LORI STIEGEL & ELLEN KLEM, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS: PROVISIONS AND CITATIONS IN ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES LAWS, BY STATE (LAWS
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B. Modeling Coerced Debt After Elder Financial Abuse?
Despite the robust private and public response to financial abuse against
elders, domestic violence and financial abuse have not received the same
attention. Financial institutions’ identification, reporting, and prevention
mechanisms for financial abuse have been in place for twenty years. Considering
that policies, trainings, and institutional memory already exist for elder abuse,
coerced debt implementation can follow a similar model.161
Requiring mandatory reporting in the domestic violence context, similar to
those already required in the elder abuse context, would incentivize credit card
companies to properly train employees and create systems to prevent coerced
debt. In addition, as demonstrated in the elder abuse context, mandatory
reporting would assist in tracking the actual prevalence of coerced debt.162 This,
in turn, may support more funding for better systems of prevention and support
for victims.163 Lastly, there is “a public interest in prosecuting criminals,” and
mandatory reporting helps the criminal justice system by identifying those
criminals and likely developing evidence of the abuser’s criminal behavior that
could later be used as evidence in prosecuting the abuser.164
There are multiple arguments against mandatory response provisions for
domestic violence. Sometimes it is reasonable for domestic violence victims to
decide to stay.165 Victims often methodically develop long-term strategies to
escape the pattern of abuse.166 Leaving a violent relationship requires
consideration of complex issues, including securing future housing or shelter,
protecting any children, saving funds, and planning police intervention.167

12/31/06) (2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/aging/docs/MandatoryReportingProvisionsChart.authcheckdam.pdf.
161. See e.g., James P. Bessolo, Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Financial Elder Abuse, 30 L.A.
LAWYER 23, 23–27 (Oct. 2007). Currently, elder financial exploitation mandatory reporting laws do
not apply to domestic violence. See NANCY DURBOROW ET AL., THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION
FUND, COMPENDIUM OF STATE STATUTES AND POLICIES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HEALTH CARE 2
(2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/ default/files/fysb/state_compendium.pdf
(“Mandatory reporting laws are distinct from elder abuse or vulnerable adult abuse and child abuse
reporting laws.”). Domestic violence mandatory reporting provisions for domestic violence do not
encompass banks or financial institutions. McFarlane, supra note 29, at 33–35.
162. James T. R. Jones, Kentucky Tort Liability for Failure to Report Family Violence, 26 N. KY. L. REV.
43, 60 (1999) (“Without obligatory reports there is significantly less information available for
measuring this type of criminal activity [and if statistics show abuse is a major problem, society is
much more likely to respond to it both with attention and adequate resources].”).
163. After a mandatory reporting law for domestic violence victims and health practitioners was
enacted in Kentucky, advocates attributed the state’s well-funded shelter system to that law.
McFarlane, supra note 29, at 17–18.
164. See id. at 33–34, 41 (explaining how mandatory reporting achieves these goals in the medical
context).
165. Id. at 22 (“When a woman makes a police report or seeks an order of protection, plans must
be put in place to ensure her safety. Only the battered women fully understands her own particular
situation, knows when and how she can be safe, and can decide when it is the right time to leave the
relationship.”).
166. See Virginia Daire, The Case Against Mandatory Reporting of Domestic Violence Injuries, 74 FLA.
B.J. 78, 78–79 (2000) (examining mandatory reporting of domestic violence within the medical
context).
167. Id.
CURRENT AS OF
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Mandatory reporting can alert the abuser to the victim’s intent to flee and force
the victim into premature flight prior to her becoming financially able to protect
herself from future serious bodily harm or homicide.168 If an abuser is alerted to a
loss of control of the victim, research has shown that the abuser will escalate the
abuse in response.169 Mandatory reporting may lead to victims’ refusal to report
coerced debt out of fear of their own safety.170 The victim has the best
information to evaluate what can be achieved based on the situation, including
the potential risk of harm from the abuser.171
CONCLUSION
The abuse that domestic violence survivors must endure, and often
overcome, is undoubtedly complex. However, by failing to fully understand
coerced debt and other economic abuse tactics used by abusers, we limit
domestic violence survivors’ opportunity to engage fully and equally in today’s
modern economy and to build financial futures of consumer choice and longterm planning. Most importantly, we implicitly condone certain acts of abuse as
tolerable, because the harm they create, which we have not even measured fully,
appears to pale in comparison to bruises or blows. In light of our new economy
of credit, we must focus on (1) researching financial abuse to understand the
problem, (2) creating incentives for financial institutions to properly monitor,
prevent, and respond to domestic violence tactics, potentially through
mandatory reporting, and (3) forming pathways for domestic violence survivors
to find financial freedom, either through better regulatory frameworks, legal
standards, or creation of financial literacy programs.

168. Id.
169. McFarlane, supra note 29, at 22 (“Many victims have been seriously injured or killed after
police reports have been made or orders of protection have been sought.”).
170. Daire, supra note 166, at 79–80.
171. Id.
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Appendix A
Interview Script
Hi, my name is Chris Kim. I work at a nonprofit organization in Durham,
NC, where I help domestic violence survivors. Do you have a moment to help
me understand what my clients should do regarding credit card problems
they’re having as a result of their ex-partners?
I have one client whose abuser opened a credit card account with your
company account in her name using her social security number without her
knowledge.
How can she contest being liable for that account?
What is the process?
Will she need to file a police report to contest the account?
If a police report is required, does she have any other option other than
filing a police report?
If she does not file a police report, will the company file a police report and
pursue charges on your own?
If she does file a police report, will your company intervene and be involved
in pursuing charges?
Will she be liable for that account and charges made to that account?
I have a second client whose abuser threatened to hurt her if she refused to
open a credit card account in her name and give full access to the credit card
account to the abuser. Out of fear, she agreed, and her abuser charged a
significant amount on the account but refuses to pay.
How can she contest being liable for that account?
Can she contest being liable for those charges?
What is the process for contesting?
Will she need to file a police report to contest the account?
If a police report is required, does she have any other option other than
filing a police report?
If she does not file a police report, will the company file a police report and
pursue charges on your own?
If she does file a police report, will your company intervene and be involved
in pursuing charges?
Will she be liable for that account and charges made to that account?
For either client, will their abusers be alerted to the fact that they have
reached out to try to close the account?
How do you verify that someone is attempting to close the account?
For either client where your company will pursue charges, will my client be
charged for the cost of that investigation?
Do you have a written policy for these issues?
Do you have a written policy for fraud/identity theft?
Do you have a written policy or protocol for domestic violence specifically?
Where can I find a copy of your policies? On your website?
Is domestic violence a frequent problem that you encounter?
Have you ever dealt with a domestic violence situation before?

Kim_Spring 2015 (Do Not Delete)

6/3/2015 7:50 PM

CREDIT CARDS: WEAPONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Do you have other similar programs?
Do you have an elder abuse protocol or policy?
What was your name again? What department?
Thank employee for his or her time.
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